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Abstract
Research on the effects of regional financial incentives has focused on firm and
aggregate employment, on capital formation, regional output, and on aspects of
regional policy efficiency. More specifically, research on regional policy efficiency has
concentrated on issues such as additionality, displacement, and deadweight, the cost
per job created, etc. The present paper examines the consequences of providing
financial incentives on firm profitability and survival.
Firm profitability may be variously defined, however, recent research has attempted
and successfully attached a wide definition of firm profitability pertaining to the firms
financial structure, efficiency and liquidity. A sample of firms that were granted aid
under the Greek regional development framework is examined and the evolution of
certain financial indices is related to the size of the granted aid. Furthermore, the effect
of various financial incentives on firm survival is measured. The receipt of grant aid
prolongs firm survival rates while it does not improve all of a firm’s profitability
indices.
JEL Classification: R58, R42, R51, G32
1. The Greek Regional Development Framework
Right after World War II, the Greek economy faced two major problems. First, a
destroyed manufacturing industry and agricultural sector and second, a large and wide
regional inequality in development and growth rates. Different goverments since 1949
attempted to solve the problem of unbalanced regional growth. In 1949, tax incentives
aiming to strengthen the industry in provinces and rural areas, were adopted by the
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strengthened and broadened these incentives. This framework stated the first ‘regional’
differentiation of industry by defining ‘provincial industry’ as every industry established
or transferred in every province and region except Athens. In 1955, the first industrial
zones were established in different towns and regions of Greece while tax reductions
for manufacturing industries were further supported and reached 80% in the lagging
areas of the country.
In the period 1961-67, the country was divided into seven planning regions. This was
eventually the first measure of decentralization of the central government, albeit the
fact that the created administrative mechanisms had no statutory rights. The first pure
regional development framework was introduced in 1971. In this framework, Greece
was divided in three regions were various quantitatively differentiated incentives held.
The first incentives concerned with tax reductions but consecutive alterations to this
basic regional framework provided subsidies for the establishment of new firms and
extended the incentives besides the manufacturing industry to the mining industry and
the primary sector. In the period to 1981, various amendments to the previously
established regional development framework extended incentive provision and support
to the tertiary sector and especially the tourism industry of the country.
In the period to 1982, the targets of the Greek regional policy as these appear from the
previously reviewed laws and as these are summarised by CPER (1976, p.84) and the
OECD (1981) were:
• The reduction of the differences in income among the different regions of the
country and more specifically between Greater Athens Area and the rest of the
country
• Decentralization from Athens of certain economic, social and administrative
activities
• Curtailment of internal migration from the less developed areas to the major cities
and particularly to Greater Athens Area
• Creation of employment opportunities in less developed regions by promoting
industrial, tourist and other economic activities
• The rational utilization of the resources of all regions
• The provision of the proper economic environment for the self-powered
development of different economic activities
• Improvement of the standard of living in the less developed regions by expanding
basic infrastructure and social services
• The improvement of the economic structure of rural areas
In 1982, the first integrated and coherent framework for regional development was
introduced by Law 1262/82. In 1990 the regional development Law 1892/90 as
amended by Law 2234/90 corrected and completed the regional development
framework held up to 1998. Under these frameworks, four types of incentives were
provided to all industries: Capital subsidies in the form of free capital provision
differentiated among the different regions of the country; Interest rate subsidy on the
bank loans received for servicing the investment; Tax free discounts on the firms net
profits, if new investments are realised; Increased depreciation on the firm’s fixed
assets.Until now, very few researchers have attempted to examine the effects of Greek
regional development policy and assess whether the aims and objectives of the policy
were met. One interesting work examined the impact of regional grant aid to the
spatial distribution and sectoral structure of investments under the regional
development framework 1262/82 (Georgiou, 1991). Psycharis and Papadaki (1996)
have attempted to examine various issues concerning with the sectoral and spatial
concentration of investments under the regional framework 1892/90. Other researchers
have examined the effectiveness and efficiency of grant-aid schemes specifically for
firms in lagging rural areas of the country, including schemes under the Common
Agricultural Policy (Skuras and Tzamarias, 1997). All aforementioned research has
focused on the effects of grant-aid on either the macro characteristics of the regions
(concentration, sectoral structure, etc.) or on job creation and the additionality of grant
aid.
There is very little research internationally on the effects of grant aid on firm
profitability and survival. In other words we have little information on the effects of
regional development grant aid on the firm’s investment behaviour and on the firm’s
performance. In this work we attempt a preliminary examination of the effects of grant
aid on firm profitability. For this reason we have selected the Food manufacturing
industry, one of the most important and dynamic sectors of the Greek economy.
2. Data and Methods
In order to accomplish our research tasks we have compiled data from three distinct
databases. First, a database of firms supported under the 1262/82 regional
development framework, including all companies that were subsidised between 1982
and 1989. Second, a database of firms supported under the 1892/90 regional
development framework, including all companies that were subsidised between 1991
and 1998. Third, a database containing financial and business characteristics of limited
firms for the period 1982 to 1998. The first two databases are maintained by the
Ministry of National economy and include all companies irrespective of their size,
while the third database is maintained by ICAP, a private consulting company and
includes only limited companies. From the three databases we isolated the companies
active in the Food-Beverages manufacturing sector and for the period 1982-1998.
Thus, for this period and for the specific type of companies we have a consolidated
database containing financial characteristics and information on grant aid. Figure 1
shows the final number of subsidised and non-subsidised firms of the Food and
Beverages Sector that remained in the database and are subject of examination.
The figure shows the total number of firms existing in the database each year and the
number of firms that had or had not received a grant aid in any year in the study
period. The total number of firms grew from 446 in 1982 to 1019 in 1997. This is not
due to firm birth during the period under consideration but due to the fact that various
firms converted their legal status to a limited company status and thus, qualified for
inclusion in the database of financial data. In the respective period we have found that
115 firms received aid from the regional development frameworks in operation. The
database of the firms financial structure contained information that allowed us to
construct a number of various indices for studying firm financial performance.The term performance is used to mean the ability to generate  the necessary resources
for investment and meeting the firms commitments  vi-a’-vis all players (employees,
government, lenders , suppliers, etc.). In evaluating a firm’s performance, it is
important to take into account  the various choices that determine the long-term
survival of the firm . Three kinds of management choices exist :
• choices of market, namely identifying a need which can be profitably satisfied, i.e.
according to the method and terms of financing obtained.
• choices of investment, i.e. defining a combination of factors of production
integrating both technology and organization;
• choices of organization, which determine how time lag in return on investment are
managed and more generally how combinations  factors of production are
implemented.
Figure 1. Number of Examined Firms
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Financing problems, particularly differences in equity between firms of different size,
may be analyzed in the light of the above choices, especially those relating to
investment. By examining the basis of a firm’s profitability, it is possible to determine
whether financing and credit access difficulties experienced by MSEs are due to the
fact that their performance is insufficient compared with that of larger firms. Many
other factors independent of the lack of equity as such may undermine the health of a
firm. These may include, for example, poorly targeted investments or investments that
take too long , or longer than forecast, to produce a return. This leads to an increase in
the enlarged debt ratio to finance the delay in the return on investment and an inability
to meet debt servicing payments due to insufficient wealth creation. The loss of one or
several markets can also cause serious difficulties, in the same way as an excessive
dependence on customers or suppliers. For this reason reference to the industry’sperformance is vital. However, in this preliminary study we do not incorporate and
aggregate industrial performance data.
There are two approaches to performance measurement. The first and easier is to
compare actual cash flow with forecasted cash flow. The second is to compare actual
profitability with the opportunity cost of capital. The second approach is difficult and
risky. Most firms measure performance in terms of accounting or book profitability.
Unfortunately book income and return on income are often seriously biased measures
of true profitability and thus should not be directly compared to the opportunity cost of
capital. In principle true or economic income is easy to calculate. In this survey we
have calculated two measures of firm performance and profitability:
• The Returns on Equity (%) and,
• The Debt to Total Assets
The Returns On Equity (ROE) measure or net financial profitability is the ratio
between the self financing capacity (after tax) and shareholder’s equity. Shareholder
contributions make up the share capital which, together with the reserves of
undistributed profits from previous years and earnings for the current year, constitute
the shareholder’s equity. Equity is a broader notion than ‘share capital’ as it includes
shareholders contributions which differ from ‘share capital’ in the sense that they
confer voting rights as well as other stable founds without voting. The Debts to Total
Asset Ratio is a leverage ratio showing how heavily the firm is in debt.
3. Results and Discussion
In order to examine the differences between subsidised and non-subsidised firms as
concern profitability we calculated the median of the ROE and Debt to Total Assets
measures. Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of the time series for the two measures
and the two criteria.
Non-subsidised firms present higher ROE for the period 1982 to 1990. Since then,
however, subsidised firms equalised and overpassed non-subsidised firms. In the last
two years of the study period under consideration ROE was almost equal for the two
groups of firms. This profitability measure is used to sudge how efficiently the firm is
using its assets. Due to the fact that the subsidy runs through the profit-loss account of
the firm and affects the profitability calculations, one may assume that subsidies
assisted supported firms to improve their financial position and more specifically their
profitability. Finally, it should be noted that, a formal test (t-test, or non-parametric
test for equality of means) does not reject the hypothesis of equality of the mean ROE
between the two groups of firms for almost every year.
From an examination of the median Debt to Total Assets Ratio shown in figure 3,
useful indications are drawn. Between 1982 and 1990, subsidised enterprises appear to
be more in debt than non-subsidised firms. In 1991 to 1997, it appears to be only small
difference between the two firm categories. Financial autonomy of subsidised firms
rose substantially between 1982 and 1990. The subsidy represents an additional cash-
flow which is assumed to strengthen the solvability position of a firm. We observe,
however, that there is considerable variability in the time series of the ratio. We
ascertain that the sources of variability should be searched within the sector and theincorporation of sector specific data will allow a further refinement of the reasons
causing the observed debt to total assets variation. Finally, it should be noted that, a
formal test (t-test, or non-parametric test for equality of means) does not reject the
hypothesis of equality of mean of debt to asset ratios between the two groups of firms
for almost every year.Figure 2. Median Return on Equity 













Figure 3. Median Debt to Total Assets (%) 










Non-Subsidised SubsidisedThe debts to total assets ratio (i.e the firm’s leverage) is closely connected to the
concept of additionality. Additional subsidies rise the firm’s leverage by intensifying
the firm’s search for raising capital. However, when investment in not additional, then
subsidies act as a substitute to the firm’s own capital and the leverage is reduced. This
point calls us to examine further the relationship between the ex-ante and ex-post
levels of leverage in relation to subsidisation. Furthermore, when examining the the
effect of subsidies on leverage, we should include other variables assumed to influence
the firm investment behaviour and the firm’s position towards additionality.
One major conclusion of our research, however, concerned with the difference in the
size of subsidised and non-subsidised firms. On the contrary of what it is widely
acknowledged for the regional development framework, we found that among the
examined firms (limited companies of the Food-Beverages sector) the subsidised firms
are considerably larger in financial size than the non-subsidised firms. We run a series
of tests on key variables indicative of financial size. Figure 4 presents the time series
for the mean equity capital for subsidised and non-subsidised firms. In the period 1982
to 1987 the difference is not very large. From 1987 onwards, the difference widens
significantly and ends up in 1997 to be very high (almost 2 billion Greek drachmas). Of
course, one may argue that the difference builds upon the received subsidies. However,
we observe a consistent pattern in the difference of size as this is revealed by total
assets, fixed assets, liquid assets, etc. Regional development policy in many European
countries has been criticized for been discretionary towards larger firms that have the
human capital and resources to prepare applications for subsidisation. This indication
should be examined under a wider econometric framework that will include a range of
factors influencing investment behaviour of firms.
Figure 4. Mean Equity Capital
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Non-Subsidised SubsidisedFirm birth and death (survival rates) were studied from the total sample of firms,
subsidised and non-subsidised included. Figure 5 shows the actual number of firms that
were established or discontinued operation during the period under consideration. The
period 1982 to 1990 is characterised by consistent firm birth, having a peak in 1986.
Firm closures are observed after 1990 with increasing rate. In total we found that a
number of around 260 firms discontinued their operation in the period 1990 to 1997,
of which, only 4 had received a subsidy. This provides strong evidence that the
regional grant aid incentives contribute towards firm survival. However, a deeper
examination of the birth and death patterns calls for an econometric model that will
attempt to identify and isolate the various factors influencing firm survival.
Figure 5. Number of Firms Created and Discontinued











4. A Future Research Agenda
Future research in the subject should be extended to various areas covering:
• A theoretical model of the investment behaviour of firms under grant aid
• An integrated econometric approach testing:
• The performance and profitability of subsidised versus non-subsidised firms
• The effects of grant-aid on firm survival
A theoretical model of investment behaviour under the grant-aid regime should be
based on investment models already proposed in the international bibliography. Grant-
aid may be introduced in investment models as another source of finance (Blundell et
al., 1992; van Tongeren, 1998). Another theoretical model attempts to identify the role
of financing sources on the firm’s investment decisions using a hierarchy of finance
(Bond and Meghir, 1994).The econometric approach to examine performance and profitability should extend the
utilised indices of ROE and debts to total assets to include indices that reflect the
firm’s financial structure, financial efficiency and liquidity as this has been defined and
used by many financial researchers (Paranque, 1997; Bacidore et al., 1996). In doing
so, the databases should be extended to include industry specific data, while the
models should use a wide range of firm specific data. The econometric methods to be
used should utilise unbalanced panel data analysis to facilitate for the unequal number
of firms in each year.
Survival and death of firms should also be examined empirically using econometric
techniques that estimate the probability of surviving given a range of covariates. Such
models have been used to estimate the survival rate of new firms (Audretsch, 1994;
Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995) and the survival of firms under article 11 of the
American law for bankruptcy (Bandopadhyaya, 1994).
Acknowledgment
This publication arises out of the ‘KARATHEODORIS’ programme 1946, financed
and administered by the University’s of Patras Research Committee. The authors
would like to acknowledge the assistance and helpful comments received by E.
Daskalopoulou, E. Dimara, N. Petrou, and T. Roussos of the Department of
Economics at the University of Patras.
References
Audretsch David B. (1994), “Business survival and the decision to exit” Inter. J. of the
Econ. of  Business, 1(1) : 125-37.
Audretsch, D., B. and Mahmood, T. (1995). New Firm Survival: new Results Using a
Hazard Function, Review of Economics and Statistics, 77, pp.97-103.
Bacidore J. M., Boquist J. A., Milbourn T. T. and Thakor A. V., (1996), “The search
for the best financial performance measure”, IFA Working Paper 244.
Bandopadhyaya, A. (1994). An Estimation of the Hazard Rate of Firms Under Chapter
11 Protection, Review of Economics and Statistics, pp.346-350.
Blundell, R., Bond, S., Devereux, M. and Sciantarelli, F. (1992). “Investment and
Tobin’s Q; Evidence from Company Panel Data”, Journal of Econometrics,
51, 233-257.
Bond S. and Meghir C.(1994), “Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm’s Financial
Policy” Review of  Econ. Studies 61: 197-222.
Centre of Planning and Economic Research, (1976). Regional Development Plan,
1976-80. CPER: Athens (in Greek).
Georgiou, G. (1991). Spatial Distribution and Sectoral Structure of Investments
under law 1262/82. Centre for Economic Planning and Research, Athens (in
Greek).
OECD (1981). Regional Problems and Policies in Greece. OECD: Paris.
Paranque, B. (1997), “Financial constraints and Economic Behavior: A Study of the
specific features of small and medium-sized manufacturing firms from 1985 to
1995”, Working Paper, Banque de France. ewp-fin/9612002.Psycharis, Y., and Papadaki, O., 1996. Investment Incentives and Regional
Development in Greece. 36th European Congress of the Regional Science
Association, Zurich, 26-30 August.
Skuras, D., and Tzamarias N. 1997. Job Creation by Assisted Rural Enterprises: A
North-South Comparison. 17
th ESRS Congress, Crete, August 1997
Van Tongeren, F.W. (1998). “Microsimulation of Corporate response to Investment
Subsidies”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 20, 55-75.